I'm reviewing some question from Mas-Collel and I am stuck on a chapter 13 question related to adverse selection.
Consider a model of positive selection in which there are workers of two possible productivity types, $\theta_H$ and $\theta_L$, with $\infty > \theta_H > \theta_L > 0$ and $\lambda = Prob(\theta=\theta_H) \in (0,1)$. A worker of type $\theta_i$ can produce $\theta_i$ for a firm in exchange for a wage $w$ or work at home and gain $r(\theta_i)$. r(.) is strictly decreasing and r$(\theta_H) < \theta_H$ and that $r(\theta_L)>\theta_L$. Show that the highest-wage competitive equilibrium need not be a constrained Pareto optimum. [13.B.9]
If the equilibrium is not a constrained Pareto optimal, then it could be a Pareto optimal, this occurs where all types are full employed when $w = \theta$, i.e. the condition that $\Theta^* = \{\theta:r(\theta) \leq w^*\}$.