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1 vote
0 answers
159 views

Please check for payoffs which I calculated in the incomplete and imperfect game

Taxpayers may either have a high income or low income, and they may be either opportunistic or honest. The tax collector cannot observe any of these characteristics, but after receiving a report from ...
studentp's user avatar
  • 192
1 vote
0 answers
223 views

Job Market Signaling

My Solution is this Separating equilibrium High type worker chooses $e_H = e^* >0$ Low type worker chooses $e_L =0$ Firms believes that if education is $e^* >0$ then the worker is high type and ...
studentp's user avatar
  • 192
1 vote
2 answers
117 views

Rule for Number of Strategies in Bayesian Games

Is there a general rule for finding the number of strategies (denote as $S$) for each player in a Bayesian game? I think it's related to the number of types (denote as $T$) and the number of actions (...
Wivaviw's user avatar
  • 23
0 votes
1 answer
438 views

Spence's Job Market Signaling Game

I have a little doubt in the Job Market Signalling Game. I am referring to A Primer in Game Theory: Gibbons, Chapter 4, Signaling Games The attached paragraph refers to a Separating Equilibrium case ...
S.Rana's user avatar
  • 401
1 vote
2 answers
332 views

Bayesian Nash Equilibria: Strong and Weak Types

I need a little help with the question. I understand that since both players have two types each, there will be 4 different payoff matrices to be considered, $(S,S)$,$(S,W)$,$(W,S)$,$(W,W)$, each type ...
S.Rana's user avatar
  • 401