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Questions tagged [bayesian-game]

For questions about Bayesian games. These are strategic interactions when one or more players have incomplete information about other players. General topics of games with asymmetric information may use this tag.

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What is the difference between Partially Observable and Incomplete information in Game theory

In reference to this paper that discusses Partially Observable Stochastic Game, it also mentions of Bayesian Game which is characterized by incomplete information. Rather then pointing out the ...
user0193's user avatar
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4 votes
1 answer
71 views

Correlation device that induces a specific transition probability

Taking a look at this paper of Forges and Vida the authors define a correlation device in page $102$, that is a standard probability space $\left(\Omega,\mathcal{B},\mu\right)$, They assume that the ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
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What if Bergemann and Morris setting used mixed (or bbehavioral) actions instead of pure actions as reccomendations?

Once again, I will refer to the setting of Bergemann and Morris (2016) and write here the payoff formula of player $i$ from the perspective of the information designer. The payoff formula is the ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
2 votes
0 answers
30 views

Pre-play, interim-play, intra-play communication games

I have a question that seems easy but I want some clarification. Suppose that we have a communication Bayesian game. The game starts when the players learn their prior infornation and after this they ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
73 views

Bergemann and Morris information designer and decision rule concept

Taking a look in the paper of Bergemman and Morris in 2016, they refer to the desicion rule as mapping $$\sigma:\Theta\times T\to\Delta(A)$$ The explanation to understand the notion of it is given as ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
2 votes
0 answers
63 views

Repeated Games of Incomplete information set up and questions

The following are from the model of Jérôme Renault (Repeated Games of incomplete infomration). The preliminaries of the model Formally, a repeated game with incomplete information is given by the ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
45 views

How to define a dynamic programming problem in an incomplete information game?

How can I define a problem of dynamic programming, to use the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in order to solve the utility maximization problem of the generic agent of a dynamic game with incomplete ...
Nav89's user avatar
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1 answer
302 views

How to analyze this two-player, imcomplete-information, extensive-form game?

Game tree: Note that the information sets for player 1 are represented by red dotted lines, while the information sets for player 2 are represented by blue shaded tapes. Described in words, the game ...
user141240's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
1k views

Is it a weakly dominant strategy to bid your true value in a third-price auction with two identical goods and N uniform distributed bidders?

I am interest in finding the optimal strategy for a single bidder (the BNE), when I have a third-price auction with N bidders and two identical goods. The bidders have iid valuations: U(0,1) I have ...
Sarah Plaug's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
85 views

What is the difference between a communication mechanism and a protocol of communication?

What is the difference between a communication mechanism and a protocol of communication in mechanism and information design. Although most papers in the literature make this distinction, it is not ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
123 views

Expected payoff calculation difficulty in the Bayesian environment of Bergemman and Morris

Suppose that we have two states of the world equally likely to occur, and say $\psi$ is the common prior of the state $\theta\in\Theta=\{G,B\}$. The types of the players are given by the following ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
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Bayesian update in the beliefs about the signals

Suppose that we have tow states of the world $\omega_1$ and $\omega_2$, where $p(\omega_1)=p(\omega_1)=1/2$ and there are three different signals, $s_H,s_M,s_L$ that are equally likely to occur in ...
Nav89's user avatar
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1 answer
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When should my beliefs be a martingale?

Suppose that I am wondering about whether an event will happen (e.g. whether it will rain tomorrow in a particular location). Suppose that my beliefs about whether the event will happen can be ...
afreelunch's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
108 views

Bayes correlated equilibrium of Bergemann and Morris

The paper of Bergemann and Morris proves a theorem based on some foundations about the information sets and their expansions. I am trying to understand theorem one intuition, more precisely I cite the ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
109 views

Mechanisms of communication in game theory

In the spirit of the previous question that I have done, here considering the paper here I am trying to make the matching definition $2.2$ here. I will give two definitions and I would like to clarify ...
Nav89's user avatar
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4 votes
1 answer
168 views

Difficulty in understanding the notation related from probability theory with game theory

The question that I have is a little technical and it has to do with the notation and the combination between some mathamatical properties in the probability theory of information economics. Say $\...
Nav89's user avatar
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2 votes
1 answer
357 views

Alternative way to calculate the symmetric BNE of the game

My problem. Consider the following auction for a single object. There are $n \geq 2$ bidders. They submit their bids simultaneously. The object is allocated to the player who submits the largest bid. ...
DanIsabel's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers
223 views

Job Market Signaling

My Solution is this Separating equilibrium High type worker chooses $e_H = e^* >0$ Low type worker chooses $e_L =0$ Firms believes that if education is $e^* >0$ then the worker is high type and ...
studentp's user avatar
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1 vote
2 answers
117 views

Rule for Number of Strategies in Bayesian Games

Is there a general rule for finding the number of strategies (denote as $S$) for each player in a Bayesian game? I think it's related to the number of types (denote as $T$) and the number of actions (...
Wivaviw's user avatar
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5 votes
1 answer
310 views

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in a Duopoly Cournot Competition

I am having a hard time to solve a Bayesian Nash equilibrium game in a duopoly cournot competition setting. So, I have two firms with given production quantities, let's say $q_1$ and $q_2$ (i.e., not ...
EagleEdge0423's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
534 views

Find a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Exercise Question 2, Chapter 28, Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory 3rd Edition by Joel Watson In part (a) of the question, we have to check if any separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium ...
rand1's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
172 views

Strong sequential equilibria and the existence of others

I am working on the following game and I have to find all strong sequential equilibria here. I determined that here any belief derived from a fully mixed strategy gives a distribution (1/2, 1/2) over ...
Rodger Haggings's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
1k views

Simultaneous vs Sequential Games [closed]

Is there a way to characterize the distinction between simultaneous vs sequential games? I'm trying to describe a situation where players can only take actions without knowledge of other players' ...
carlogambino's user avatar
5 votes
0 answers
197 views

How to find an optimal strategy in an auction?

I have asked this question in mathematics forum as well but since I have not recieved an appropriate answer yet, I ask it here as well. Consider an auction of sculptures by four artists: A, B, C and D....
plpm's user avatar
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5 votes
1 answer
634 views

What does 'continuation' as in continuation games, strategies, plays, etc. exactly mean?

I am in my first course in grad level game theory. While I was reading through Fudenberg and Tirole's Game Theory, I constantly come into contact with the word 'continuation' to describe some games ...
David Kim's user avatar
0 votes
1 answer
142 views

Find a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a game that includes Nature

I want to determine all pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for this task, but I cannot get very far. Side note: First number is payoff for A, second number payoff for player B. For the last ...
Quant's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
590 views

Exchange Houses game - Bayesian Game

Can anyone help me understand how to solve this type of asymmetric information Bayesian game? So the game is a different version of the Tadelis 'trading house games'. It involves 2 players that each ...
peninette's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
2k views

Mixed Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

There was an exercise question regarding two players with two types each in a game theory class. The two players were assigned to do a team project together. The utility from doing the team project is ...
Robin311's user avatar
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3 votes
2 answers
622 views

Mixed Strategies in Bayes Nash Equilibrium (Bayesian Battle of the Sexes). Shouldn't it depend on $p$?

I have a question about calculating mixed strategies in a Bayes Nash Equilibrium in a simple 2-player bimatrix game. To demonstrate the issue, consider ``Bayesian Battle of the Sexes.'' Suppose P1 ...
ABC's user avatar
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2 votes
1 answer
141 views

I cannot understand Sobel & Crawford 1982 (cheap talk)

I am a master student, currently reading this paper for fun during the break. I got lost during the part $U^S(\bar y, \bar m, b) = \max_{y \in Y} U^S(y,\bar m, b)$ on page 5. I dont understand why ...
Aspiring Economist's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
516 views

Pooling equilibrium in akerlof's lemon market with certification cost

Consider a market for 300 used cars where 1/3 of all cars are good quality cars and the rest are bad quality cars. All these cars are owned by (potential) sellers to begin with and each seller owns ...
Deepanshu Yadav's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
213 views

Find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Each of two sellers, $1$ and $2$ owns one indivisible object that a buyer would like to buy. The two objects are identical. The buyer´s valuation depends on the number of objects he gets. The ...
crosscut22's user avatar
2 votes
2 answers
844 views

Pure-Strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium with general common prior

I'm doing a problem set on the subject of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. I'm asked to find the pure-strategy BNE of the following. I've calculated to matrix shown below. My first concern is if I've ...
Justin Malik's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
413 views

Blackwell order of information structures

Consider a model where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world. The state of the world has support $\mathcal{V}$. ...
Star's user avatar
  • 378
3 votes
0 answers
90 views

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for banks

I'm reading this paper on credit lending cycles and trying to understand how it works for the case of one bank. This is the set-up of the model: There are two players, a bank and the market. There ...
Meera Unni's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
319 views

How to prove the WPBE is SE in signaling game?

The definition of a signaling game: A signaling game is an extensive game with the following structure: (i) A move of chance first determines a state of the world/type $t ∈ T$, which is drawn from T ...
lalala8797's user avatar
1 vote
1 answer
875 views

First Price Auction (Expected Payoff)

I'm trying to solve followed first-price auction problem. Bidder's pdf is $$ f(v_i)= \begin{cases} \dfrac{1}{8}v_i, & \text{if} & 0\leq v_i\leq4\\ 0, & \text{if} & \text{otherwise}\\ ...
ali's user avatar
  • 13
3 votes
1 answer
70 views

Example of information structure in a one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Model Consider a game where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world. The state of the world has support $\mathcal{...
Star's user avatar
  • 378
3 votes
1 answer
217 views

Uniqueness of equilibria in first-price auction with discrete valuations

Assume we have a first-price auction with discrete and independent private values and identical distributions of all bidders. It is known that there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where bidders bid ...
AlexanderJI's user avatar
0 votes
1 answer
50 views

Write search model as a signal density inducing posterior belief

Consider a decision maker (DM) who as to choose an action from the finite set $\mathcal{Y}$ with cardinality $L. $ The payoff the he gets depends on the action chosen and the state of the world. The ...
Star's user avatar
  • 378
1 vote
1 answer
79 views

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium with complete information

Model Consider a game where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world. The state of the world has support $\mathcal{...
Star's user avatar
  • 378
0 votes
1 answer
108 views

Some basic questions on infromation asymmetry

How does asymmetric information and bid-ask spread are connected? For instance, economic theory tells us that, the more the problem of information asymmetry, the higher the spread is. What is the ...
Nav89's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
130 views

Set of Bayes Correlated Equilibria when complete information is not available

Model Consider a game where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world. The state of the world has support $\mathcal{...
Star's user avatar
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2 votes
2 answers
109 views

Information and search

Consider a game where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $l\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world $V$. The choice set $\mathcal{Y}$ has cardinality $L$....
Star's user avatar
  • 378
0 votes
1 answer
189 views

Refinements in signaling games with three sender types

What are the pros and cons of the Intuitive Criterion and the Criterion of Divinity in signaling games with three types? I find that separating equilibria often survive the intuitive criterion, ...
Lotte's user avatar
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1 vote
1 answer
178 views

Algorithm to find Bayesian Nash Equilibria [closed]

I am working on a Bayesian game with a finite number of players and discrete types, but the complexity of the equations is not allowing me to find the BNEs by hand. I read a paper describing ...
Ishan Kashyap Hazarika's user avatar
0 votes
1 answer
74 views

REE with asymmetric information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium?

What is the difference between a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) with asymmetric information and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE)? Since agents in both cases play some game or have a strategic ...
Nav89's user avatar
  • 498
2 votes
1 answer
4k views

Finding Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

I'm recently new to Game Theory and I've recently started teaching myself about Bayesian Nash Equilibirum. I've stumbled across a problem set that I can't seem to wrap my head around concerning ...
Lundu Chibwa's user avatar
3 votes
2 answers
90 views

Exact definition of one-player Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium

Consider a game where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world $V$. The state of the world has support $\mathcal{V}$. ...
Star's user avatar
  • 378
1 vote
1 answer
607 views

First-price symmetric auction with discrete value

I've been trying to work the following problem out but I can't quite seem to understand it, or the whole concept of first-place auctions. I don't understand how we get to the equilibrium. The problem ...
Vee's user avatar
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